Thomas Hobbes's Conception of Peace by Maximilian Jaede

Author:Maximilian Jaede
Language: eng
Format: epub, pdf
Publisher: Springer International Publishing, Cham

On this account, people cannot act unjustly towards others for as long as they retain their natural right to all things. Therefore, injustice presupposes a contract in which individuals renounce this right. In The Elements of Law and De cive, Hobbes argues similarly that injustice equals ‘injury’ [inuria] or acting ‘without right’ [sine iure], which is impossible in a state of nature where people have a right to all things (EL 16.2, 88; DC 3.3, 44).

Justice , understood as the performance of contractual obligations, only concerns life in civil society . On some occasions, Hobbes suggests that there can be covenants in a state of nature (EL 15.10, 84–5; DC 2.11, 37; Lev 14, 210). For as long as people retain their natural right to all things, however, they are not bound in the same way as they are in civil society. In a state of nature, contracts that involve mutual trust are void if people suspect that another party will not perform their promise (Lev 14, 210). By contrast, everyone in civil society is compelled by the sovereign to keep faith, so people have no reason to doubt another party’s future performance (EL 15.10, 84–5; DC 2.11, 37; Lev 14, 210).

Hobbes’s concern is specifically with justice of actions, as opposed to justice of manners. While some people may have a disposition to be just—and, perhaps, would even act justly in a state of nature—civil society provides conditions under which everyone is forced to honour their obligations . In some instances, Hobbes equates justice of actions with obedience to the civil laws, which are made and enforced by the sovereign (EL 16.4, 88–9; DC 3.5, 46; Lev 15, 226–8). This can be understood in view of the fact that, for him, the obligation to obey the law is derived from the social contract in which people submit to political authority. 10 In his discussions of law in De cive and Leviathan, he states explicitly that, as part of the social contract, people have agreed to obey all the laws that are made and enforced by the sovereign (DC 14.10, 158–9; Lev 26, 418). Thus, on Hobbes’s account, states or commonwealths provide necessary conditions for justice of actions insofar as their members are forced to obey the law and to honour their private agreements. The performance of the social contract and the keeping of private covenants are connected insofar as the former entails obedience to the laws made by the sovereign, which, in turn, guarantee security of contract in private transactions. 11

In addition to contract laws, Hobbes discusses distributive and criminal laws, which create and protect individual rights (cf. Olsthoorn 2015, 29–32). While Hobbes emphasises the conventional origin of private property in all of his works, De cive and Leviathan contain more extensive statements on the genesis of exclusive personal rights. 12 For instance, in the former work, Hobbes states:The principles that each man has his own right proper to him and distinct from another’s, and that he is forbidden to violate the rights of others, have their source in the civil laws.

Download

Copyright Disclaimer:
This site does not store any files on its server. We only index and link to content provided by other sites. Please contact the content providers to delete copyright contents if any and email us, we'll remove relevant links or contents immediately.